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I. Depa:rtnental Organization and Responsihili ties 
A. Interior is ·the primary public land management agency. 
1. M:>st public land statutes vest authority in the Secre-
tary 1 subject to his power to delegate it. (E .·g. 1 30 
U.S.C. 181; Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1950, §l(a), 
64 Stat. 1262, 5 U.S.C. Appendix.) 
a. M:>st statutes authorize the Secretary to issue 
rules and take 1 necessary and proper 1 action to 
.implarent the statutes. (E.g. 1 30 U.S.C. 189.) 
b. The Secretary has general txJWers to administer 
public lands by statute (e.g., 43 U.S.C. 1201) and 
by case law even where the statute is silent (Cam-
·erort v. u ~s. 1 252 u.s. 450 (1920) . 
2. Statutes vesting authority in the Secretary may apply to 
lands otherwise administered by another agency, such as 
the Forest Service. The !Jf.J.neral Leasing Act of 1920 is 
one of these. (30 u.s.c. 181--see paper # 2.) 
B. Interior 1 s current delegations are from the Secretary, through 
the Under Secretary and the Assistant Secretary, Land and ~.in­
erals J'!Janagement, to the Bureau of land Managerrent (BIM) and 
the Minerals Management Service (MMS) • 
1. Fran 1920 to present BIM, and its predecessor the General 
land Office, issued mineral leases and kept lease rerords. 
(E.g., GID Circular No. 672, 47 L.D. 437 ; (1920); sec. 403 
of Reorganization Plan No~ . 3 of 1946, 60 Stat. 1097 I 5 
u.s.c. Appendix.~ Secretarial Order {S.O~l No. 2948 . (Oct. 
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6, 1972).) 
2. From 1925 to 1982, the Conservation Division of the U.S. 
Geological Survey administered lease operations and col-
lected royalties. (Instructions, 51 L.D. 219 (1925); but 
see 47 L.D. at 438, ,12.) 
3. In January 1982 the Conservation Division's onshore min-
eral leasing functions were transferred to the new .MMS. 
(S.O. No. 3071, Jan. 19, 1982.) 
4. In December 1982 the lease operations supervision-..,..pennits 
to drill, onsi te inspections--fnnctions of M-15 were trans-
ferred to BIM. MMS retained the production and royalty 
reporting, valuation, and collection fnnctions for all 
leases, offshore and onshore federal as well as Indian. 
(S.O. No. 3087, §5, Dec. 3, 1982.) 
5 .' In December 1983 the relevant Assistant Secretaries' 
fnnctions were realigned and both ~f) and BIM cane under 
the sa:rre Assistant Secretary. lmy inconsistency in policy 
or position between MM:> and BIM on a matter handled in 
ccmron, such as a royalty reduction request, can nav be 
resolved without having to ascend the Depari:Irent to the 
Under Secretary's level. 
6. A Merrorandum of Understanding between MMS and BIM describes 
the functions of and relations between the ~ in detail. 
C~ The Solicitor •·s Office ':.s role is often misnnderstcxxl. 
1.. It advises the ~cretary and all delegates of the Secre-
tary, both infonnall y and in writing. 
2. Written opinions c:x:nre in different kinds~ 
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a. Formal "H" numbered opinions are published 
and indexed, and are intended to dissemi-
nate the Department's legal position. 
b. 'Lower' level opinions may be subject to 
the assertion of attorney-client privilege, 
although generally they are available as 
guidance for the public as well as the 
agency officials. 
3. Roles may change. The Solicitor's Office will 
represent BLM before the Board of Land Appeals 
and, through the Justice Department, represent the 
Board of Land Appeals in court even though the 
Board rejected BLM's position. (E.g., Getty Oil 
Co. v. U.S., Civil No. 84-0320 (D. Wyo.).) 
D. The role of the Office of Hearings and Appeals, and 
its Interior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA), is developed 
in Part III. B. below. 
II. New Developments 1n Mineral Leasing--Oil and Gas and Coal 
A. Legislative proposals are being drafted to change the 
current mix of noncompetitive and competitive oil and 
gas leasing chiefly to deal with the perceived prob-
lems in the so-called 'simultaneous' leasing system 
applicable to lands that have previously been leased. 
(See paper # 8.) 
B. The "KGS" is being examined and reexamined. Lands in 
the "known geological structure of a producing oil or 
gas field" must be leased competitively; lands not 
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within the · same must be leased noncompetitively. (30 
U.S.C. 226(b), 226(c).) 
1. vvhat does the Fort Chaffee case mean? A non-geo-
logical clearance of land as non-KGS is improper. 
(Arkla Explor. Co. v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 734 
F.2d 347 (8th Cir. 1984), aff'g 562 F. Supp. 1214 
(W.D. Ark. 1983) and 548 F. Supp. 466 (W.D. Ark. 
19 8·2) . ) 
2. What else? The regulation defining KGS as "the 
trap in which ... oil or gas has been discovered 
.... includ [ ingl all acreage that is presumptively 
productive" is now in question. (43 CFR 3100.0-5 
(1) .) The District Court held the rule to be il-
legally restrictive (562 F. Supp. at 1226), and 
the Court of Appeals criticized it without any 
express conclusion. (734 F.2d at 359 n. 16.) 
But the Court of Appeals also praised the BLM's 
Instruction Memorandum 84-35 (Oct. 14, 1983) which 
gives guidance on making geology-based KGS deter-
minations within the context of the existing rule. 
(734 F.2d at 361-62.) 
3. What more? Some say the Court of Appeals estab-
lished a new, independent basis for a KGS determin-
ation, 'competitive interest.' In context, the 
Court held that the Department's failure to con-
sider the competitive interest in the tracts when 
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clearing the land as non-KGS rendered the deter-
m~nations in that case arbitrary and capricious. 
(734 F.2d at 360-61.) BLM has not employed com-
petitive interest in making KGS determinations 
except as a warning to do the geology carefully. 
C: NEPA compliance in oil and gas leasing, especially 
over-the-counter (first-time) leasing of national 
forest and other sensitive lands, and the relation of 
protective lease stipulations to NEPA compliance, is 
under court review in several important cases. 
papers 6 and 7.) 
(See 
D. The rules for inspection and enforcement (I & E) of 
operating standards for onshore lease sites are in 
their first-year trial, and portions are already under 
review for revision. (43 CFR Subpart 3160, 49 Fed. 
Reg. 3 7 3 6 3 (Sept. 21, 19 8 4) . 
1. The penalty tables and automatic assessment ' 
provisions have resulted in assessments out of 
scale with the severity of the violations. 
2. Some industry members continue to object to 
BLM's rules assesslng penalties under Mineral 
Leasing Act authority for violations prior to 
the 20-day abatement period provided for in sec. 
1 0 9 ( a ) of "FOG RMA" . { 3 0 U . S . C . 1 7 1 9 ( a ) . See 
43 CFR 3163.4-l(a), derived in part from 30 U.S.C. 
188(a) ar:. ... 30 U.S.C. 1753(a) .) 
3. These rules implement, in large part, recommenda-
tions of the first Linowes Commission Report, 
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"Fiscal Accountability of the Nation's Energy 
Resources," but they are designed somewhat dif-
ferently from, and raise different issues than, 
the royalty rules treated in papers 4 and 5. 
E. NEPA compliance in the coal program remains a big 
source of controversy (see papers 10 and 13). 
1. The Montana District Court has found the 1982 
Powder River Region lease sale EIS inadequate 
as it related to the several tracts in Montana 
on NEPA grounds, among others. (Northern Chey-
enne Tribe v. Hodel, Civil No. 82-116 (D. Mont. 
May 2 8 , 1 9 8 5 ) . ) 
2. The comment period closed on the Draft Supplement 
to the 1979 Program EIS, and the con~ents of the 
program's critics make it clear that there is 
not yet a consensus on the purpose and proper 
scope of programmatic NEPA work for the federal 
coal program. 
F. Money remains a critical lssue ln the federal coal 
program, although the focus has shifted for the time 
being from public criticism of low bonuses to industry 
criticism of high royalties. 
1. The 'fair market value' portion of the Powder 
River Lease Sale suit has been submitted to the 
court slnce December 1982. Plaintiffs seek fur-
ther discovery in their challenge on 'fmv', while 
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defendants challenged plaintiffs' standing to 
litigate the issue. Now that the Northern Chey-
enne decision is out, we await this one. 
2. The readjustment cases (paper # 12) challenge the 
Department's position that it will impose Federal 
Coal Leasing Amendments Act (FCLAA) royalty rates 
on pre-1976 leases when it readjusts them. Dis-
cussion of this subject plays against two back-
ground themes: economically, we are in a twenty-
year transition period where owners of new and 
readjusted leases (with 12&1/2 % of gross value 
royalty rates) are competing with those still mar-
keting coal from 20c/ton rate leases; and legally, 
if the broad, general theory attacking readjust-
ments is correct, then the comparable imposition 
of FCLAA diligence requirements may be vulnerable. 
3. This disparity in royalty rates, combined with cur-
rent market conditions, have focused lessees' at~en­
tion on the Department's policy for (or against) 
reducing the rate at which royalty will be paid 
below that specified in the lease. The Mineral 
Leasing Act authorizes the Secretary to do so for 
"the purpose of encouraging the greatest ultimate 
recovery of coal ... whenever ... necessary ... in 
order to promote development, or whenever ... the 
leases cannot be successfully operated under 
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[ their] terms . " ( 3 0 U . S . C . 2 0 9 ; 4 3. CF R 3 4 8 5 . 
2(c); 30 CFR 203.200(c) .) 
G. "Diligence" l?erhaps more than any 1ssue 1s an emo-
tiQnal touchstone of the coal program. The clock is 
ticking down on the effective date of FCLAA 'dili-
gence' requirements (see paper 11, as well as 10 and 
13) . 
1. "Section J" of the FCLAA will become effective 
August 4, 1986, barring legislation. (30 u.s.c. 
201(a) (2) (A).) Interior's guidelines to imple-
ment it received much comment. (50 Fed. Reg. 
6398 (Feb. 15, 1985) .) Interior's Solicitor's 
Opinion on section 3 has been challenged in one 
particular--its conclusion that the prohibition 
in section 3 extends to the issuance of oil and 
gas leases because the statute uses the phrase 
"under this Act." (Opinion M-~6951, Feb. 12, 
1985; Conoco, Inc. v. Hodel, Civil No. 85-277 
(D. Del~ filed May 10, 1985) .) 
2. Section 7 diligence requirements ("produce in ten 
years") are now affecting the first leases issued 
and readjusted after the FCLAA--prospective pur-
chasers of coal are concerned tnat hhe lessee 
will lose the lease before he will be able to de-
velop the mine and produce the magic, lease-exten-
ding tonnage of coal. 
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H. Preference right coal lease applications are stil 
with us. (30 U.S.C. 20l(b) (1970), amended "subject 
to valid existing rights" by sec. 4 of the FCLAA, 
90 Stat. 1085.) About 130 of them are caught in 
negotiations begun in mid-1983 over BLM's asserted 
failure to comply with NEPA in processing them. 
(See NRDC v. Berklund, 458 F. Supp. 925 (D.D.C. 
1978), aff'd, 609 F.2d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1979) .) 
I. Behind these program components are several broader 
issues that directly impact onshore federal mineral 
leasing. 
1. The BLM-Forest Service "Interchange," as currently 
conceived, would give mineral leasing authority, 
as well as lease administration, to the Forest 
Service for those areas described in the concept 
maps as ending up under FS jurisdiction. Sim-
· plistically, it would be as if the Mineral Leasing 
Act read like several provisions of the Federal 
Land Policy and Management Act: "the Secretary 
of the Interior, and with respect to lands within 
the National Forest System the Secretary of Agri-
culture, is authorized .... " (Borrowed from 43 
u.s.c. 1761.) 
2. State participation 1n program operation, and 
state and local control over lessees are subjects 
that generate a group of disputes (see paper 15). 
a. State standing to challenge federal leasing 
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decisions, derived from its interest in its 
share of lease revenues (30 U.S.C. 191; 
Arkla, above, 734 F.2d at 353-54), is at 
issue. The Western Attorneys General have 
expressed an interest in a standardized right 
of notice of and participation in IBLA cases 
that affect redistributed revenues. 
b. BLM is completing Resource Management Plans 
designed to be consistent with local plans 
and policies "to the maximum extent [DOI] 
finds consistent with Federal law." (43 
U.S.C. 1712(c) (9); 43 CFR 1610.3-2.) In the 
mineral leasing context, this returns planners 
and local officials to the questions: what 
local law lS "applicable" to federal mineral 
lessees; and what kinds of local ordinances 
"impermissibly conflict" with federal law (as 
expressed in the Mineral Leasing Act)? (See 
Ventura County v. Gulf Oil Corp., 601 F.2d 
1080 (9th Cir. 1979), aff'd per curiam, 445 
u.s. 947 (1980). 
c. Many conflicts arise directly from lessees' 
assertions of preemption of state law, not 
from Interior Department action. Secretary 
Hodel has been asked to state his position on 
a public utility's authority to condemn geo-
thermal steam leases, not to defeat or term-
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inate the federal leases, but to operate 
them, over the objection of the lessee. 
The lessee got an injunction against the 
state law condemnation action, arguing pre-
emption--that the state law is inconsistent 
with the Geothermal Steam Act of 1970 in its 
limits on how one acquires leases and its 
policy to promote risk investment in devel-
opment. (Grace Geothermal Corp. v. Northern 
Calif. Power Agency, Civil No. 84-6741JPV 
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 1984), appeal remanded, 
No. 84-2595 (9th Cir. May 2, 1985), for find-
ings of fact and conslusions of law.) 
III. Dispute Resolution in Mineral Leasing 
A. Informal methods exist and may work best, especially 
before any formal decision is rendered. 
1. The letter usually gets answered. "What happened 
to my application?" "Have you changed policy on 
subject X?" Refer to the case serial number(s) 
and the letter will make it to the file. 
2. The meeting puts misconceptions, misunderstandings 
and concerns or issues on the table. Schedules 
may be negotiated. 
3. The PROTEST asserts any error in, or complains 
about, a proposed BLM action or a pending matter. 
(43 CFR 4.450-2.) It is the bridge to more formal 
action. BLM must act on the written protest be-
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fore or at the same time that it acts on the 
application or matter protested. 
4. There are tow traps to avoid: the delegation 
trap and the estoppel trap. 
a. The BLM is a decentralized agency. Know 
who is responsible for the decision you 
are concerned about (lease issuance, permit 
to drill, lease readjustment, etc.). Many 
field personnel advise, do reports and rec-
ommend, and BLM may not be able to act until 
they all do. But know who decides. The 
ubiquitous term 'authorized officer' may be 
a district manager, a state director, a 
branch chief 1n a state office, or an area 
Manager. It 1s the lowest person in the 
hierarchy to whom the decision power has been 
delegated. (43 CFR 3000.0-5 (e). 
b. BLM resists estoppel. It will not be bound 
by oral mistatements or mis-advice by its 
officials regarding statutory or regulatory 
requirements, filing deadlines, etc. (43 CFR 
1810.3.) The courts have made this rule less 
than absolute, but under the standard formu-
lation, to bind BLM to a mistatement by its 
employee, you will have to show: i) you 
reasonably relied on the BLM assertion; ii) 
the reliance was detrimental--you were 
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harmed; iii) BLM intended that you rely 
on the matter misrepresented (was the 
properly delegated official speaking?); 
and iv) that there was 11 affirrnative miscon-
duct11 in BLM so representing the matter. 
(U.S. v. Wharton, 514 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 
1975) (estoppel found); U.S. v. Ruby Co., 
(9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, U.S. 
(1979) (no estoppel--no affirmative miscon-
duct); see U.S. v. Locke, No. 83-1394 (U.S. 
April 1, 1985), Slip Op. at 5 n. 7, concur-
rence at 2-3.) 
B. Formal dispute resolution within Interior. 
1. Several types of BLM action are reviewable with-
in BLH. 
a. Resource management plans are formulated by 
district managers but adopted, after public 
comment and with the managers' recommenda-
tions, by state directors. (43 CFR 1610. 
4-7, .4-8, .5-1.) Specific protest proce-
dures exist here. (43 CFR 1610.5-2.) 
b. "Technical and procedural revievJ 11 is avail-
able from the State Director within ten days 
of any order or instruction issued (usually 
by a district or area manager) under the oil 
and gas operating rules. (43 CFR 3165~3, for 
all matters treated in 43 CFR Part 3160.) 
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2. Final BLM action may generally be appealed to 
the Office of Hearings and Appeals (OHA) for 
its review. (E.g., 43 CFR 4.410.) Some BLM 
actions, where hearings are required, go to an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) . (E.g. , 4 3 CFR 
3163.4-1(b) (7) .) Most adjudications, where a 
protest is dismissed or denied, or a "Decision" 
lS rendered to an applicant or lessee, or both, 
go to the Board of Land Appeals (IBLA). 
3. IBLA was formed, v..rithi:R OHA, by Secretarial di-
rective in 1970 to consolidate appeal functions, 
and in part to resolve a recurring due process 
problem in the hearings process where the Solici-
tor's Office (Washington) decided appeals on cases 
the.Solicitor's Office (field) had prosecuted for 
BLM. (Memorandum of Jan. 30, 1970 from Solicitor 
to Secretary Hickel, "Reorganization of Depart-
mental Appeals and Hearings Administration;" re 
due process see Oil Shale Corp. v. Morton, 370 
F. Supp. 108, 129 (D. Colo. 1973), vacated, No. 
7 4 -13 4 4 ( 1 0 th C i r . Sept . 2 2 , 1 9 7 5 ) . ) 
1. The move abolished the BLM Director's Office 
of Ap~eals and Hearings, then a mandatory re-
view step, but it did not abolish a compara-
ble intermediate review step for Geological 
Survey decisions. This intermediate review 
step was inherited and retained by MMS, and 
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applies to all onshore royalty cases. 
(30 CFR Part 290 (1984) .) 
b. IBLA is not statutory, but it does serve 
the purpose of meeting FLPMA 1 s 1976 state-
ment of policy that the Secretary "struc-
ture adjudication procedures to assure ... 
objective administrative review of initial 
decisions." (43 U.S.C. 170l(a) (5), but see 
43 u.s.c. 1701(b) .) 
4. What IBLA does and does not do. 
a. IBLA construes statutes and regulations, 
making law for the Department as it does so. 
Inherent in this is the power to overrule its 
own decisions, and Solicitor•s Opinions. (E.g., 
U.S. v. Union Carbide Corp., 84 I.D. 309 (1977), 
overruling M-36823 (May 7, 1971) .) 
b. IBLA has 1 de novo• review power over factual 
matters, including facts found by ALJ•s at 
adversary hearings, and de novo review over 
land management judgments and policy state-
ments. (43 CFR 4.1(3), 4.1--"as fully and 
finally as might the Secretary". Eldon Brin-
kerhoff, 83 I.D. 185 (1976); also 79 I.D. 596 
(1972) .) It has imposed limiting review 
standards on itself over time. Check the 
cases on your subject matter to find out if 
such a standard applies to your appeal. (E.g., 
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George Jalbert, 39 IBLA 205 (1979) (timber 
sale--will not reverse decision unless 
"clearly in error"); Apache Oro Co., 16 IBLA 
' 
281 (1974) (mineral lease rejection--will not 
reverse if "adequate basis of record").) 
c. IBLA does not rule on the constitutionality 
of statutes, having concluded that is out-
side its authority. (E.g., Charlie Carnal, 
43 IBLA 10 (1979); Al Sherman, 38 IBLA 300 
(1978).) 
d. IBLA does not declare duly promulgated regu-
lations to be 1n excess of statutory authority, 
having concluded that the legality of rules is 
determined by the Department when it promul-
gates them. (E.g., Exxon Co., U.S.~., 45 
IBLA 313 (1980); City of Kotzebue, 83 I.D. 
313 (1976).) 
5. What are the procedural possibilities and traps 1n 
an IBLA case. 
a. During the appeal period, and upon its filing 
until IBLA decision, the BLM decision is sus-
pended or stayed. (43 CFR 4.21(a), except as 
BLM rules provide to the contrary.), Parties, 
including BLM, may seek to reverse the status 
quo by filing for relief using standards like 
preliminary injunction considerations-- irre-
parable injury, balance of harms, etc. 
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b. Standing at IBLA approximates federal court 
standing, but one must focus on IBLA's spe-
cific regulation: "Any party to a case who 
is adversely affected by a [BLM] decision" 
has a right to appeal. (43 CFR 4.410.) 
Someone who timely protests a proposed action 
thereby becomes a "party," according to IBLA, 
but one must still establish that one is "ad-
versely affected." (Donald Pay, 85 IBLA 283 
(1985) .) It is also possible to be adversely 
affected and not be a party, by failure to 
have protested timely. (In Re Pacific Coast 
Holybdenum Co., 68 IBLA 325 (1982) .) 
c. Few mineral leasing situations call for adver-
sary hearings, but they may be ordered by IBLA 
1n its discretion. (43 CFR 4.415, referring 
to 43 CFR 4.430 to4.439.) IBLA has employed 
this authority in some disputed KGS cases. 
(Jack J. Bender, 40 IBLA 26 (1979), rev'd on 
other grounds, Bender v. Clark, 744 F.2d 1424 
( 1 0 th C i r . 1 9 8 4 ) . ) 
d. Once a case is appealed, it is no longer 
within BLM's jurisdiction, according to IBLA. 
(E.g., Duncan Miller, 38 IBLA 154, 158 (1978); 
Utah P. & L. Co., 14 IBLA 372 (1974) .) 
6. A number of procedures bypass IBLA or reverse the 
normal status of a case pending at IBLA. 
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a. Several recent BLM regulations make BLM 
decisions 'final' agency actions. (E.g., 
43 CFR 1610.5-2(b); 43 CFR 3427.2(k).) 
These rules, however, were not accompanied 
by any amendment to IBLA's jurisdictional 
rule. (43 CFR 4.410.) IBLA has not spoken 
1n an adjudication on the effect of such a 
provision; BLM, however, will treat such a 
decision as effective, and there will be no 
'right of appeal' paragraph in such a decision. 
b. Another cluster of BLM rules, and MNS's rules 
governing royalty disputes, make the decisions 
issued thereunder effective pending appeal, 
employing the 'out' in 43 CFR 4.21(a). 
(E.g., 43 CFR 3451.2 (e); 43 CFR 2884.1 (b); 
30 CFR Parts 202, 203 and 290 (1984) .) Here 
the appellant must proceed at IBLA to get ex-
pedited rev1ew, or to get the decision stayed 
pending appeal. Note that such an ~lliS or BLM 
decision is final for purposes of judicial re-
view, and the appellant may elect judicial 
instead of IBLA rev1ew. 
c. An adjudication by, or specifically approved 
by, the Secretary, is final for the Depart-
ment, and the Secretary may assume jurisdic-
tion over any case at any time. (43 CFR 4.5.) 
For mineral leasing purposes, "Secretary " 
includes the Assistant Secretary, Land and 
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Minerals Management. (Blue Star, Inc., 
41 IBLA 333 (1979) .) The authority to 
bypass IBLA lS rarely exercised, and some 
assume BLM arranges it only to avoid likely 
reversal by IBLA. The usual cases, however, 
involve matters where the Secretary seeks 
either: 1) to declare policy; 2) to recon-
cile conflicting precedent; or 3) to prevent 
any appellate delay in a matter requiring, 
from the Secretary's perspective, expedited 
treatment. (James W. Canon, 84 I.D. 176 
(1977) (policy statement); Jones-O'Brien, Inc., 
85 I.D. 89 (1978) (reconciling precedent).) 
d. IBLA's decision is final agency action. 
IBLA's rules authorize reconsideration, and 
authorize Secretarial and OHA Director's 
reconsideration of IBLA decisions. (43 CFR 
4 . 21 (c) ; 4 3 CF R 4 . 5 ( a) ( 2) and 4 . 5 (b) . ) How- ' 
ever, it 1s not necessary to do so to have a 
final decision, and doing so will not prevent 
any relevant statute of limitations from run-
n1ng. (43 CFR 4.21(c); 30 U.S.C. 226-2; 
Winkler v. Andrus, 494 F. Supp. 946 (D. Wyo.), 
rev'd on other grounds, 614 F.2d 707, 709 
(lOth Cir. 1980).) 
i. Only if IBLA grants the petition will 
there be a new decision to start a new 
limitations period. 
-19-
(See Tallman v. 
Udall, 324 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1963), 
revrd on other grounds, 380 U.S. 1 (1965) .) 
11. Reconsideration is likely to be granted 
only to reconsider a case 1n light of in-
tervening case law, or in light of some 
novel argument or facts raised in the 
petition and excusably not raised before. 
C. Litigation has its virtues, but speed, simplicity and 
dispute resolution are rarely among them. 
1. Know the relation between the administrative 
process and judicial review. 
a. The relation between decisions of BLM, MMS 
and IBLA and finality is discussed above in 
connection with effectiveness and reconsider-
ation. 
b. Any suit regarding a Departmental proceeding 
that is not final (or not effective pending 
appeal) 1s subject to a federal motion to 
dismiss as oremature for failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies, and in the alterna-
tive for a stay under the doctrine of pri-
mary jurisdiction. 
c. Any suit regarding a BLM or MMS decision not 
timely appealed to IBLA is subject to a fed-
eral motion to dismiss as barred for failure 
to exhaust a required administrative remedy. 
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d. Review of an IBLA case is usually review 
under 5 U.S.C. 706(2) (A), on the certi-
fied administrative record. The extent 
to which a court will allow discovery, and 
the introduction of the fruits of discovery 
for any reason either to impeach the record, 
to supplement an inadequate record, or not 
at all varies from circuit to circuit, and 
among factual circumstances. 
2. The Justice Department is the Secretary's trial 
lawyer, and controls the conduct and disposition 
of litigation, generally as the Secretary requests. 
a. On matters of litigation policy, including 
practice construing the federal rules, and 
on matters of law common to multiple agen-
cies, Justice is obligated to assert consls-
tent positions, and to reconcile diverging 
positions of its agency clients. 
b. In this role, Justice settles cases, decides 
to appeal (or not to appeal) adverse court 
decisions, and otherwise to represent the 
interests of the United States in a manner 
different 1n these important respects from 
private trial counsel. Once litigation is 
begun, a negotiated settlement requires 
working with both agencies, Justice and Inter-
ior, not just one. 
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3. I present the 1985 speed and certainty awards 
for litigation involving minerals and the 
Department of the Interior. The nominees are: 
a. The oil shale mining claims assessment work 
contests. 
b. The Powder River Coal Lease Sale litiga-
tion, Part II, involving fair market value, 
proper tract delineation and the unsuitabil-
ity standards for pre-lease environmental 
review. 
c. The Jicarilla Apache reservation gas royalty 
valuation cases. 
d. The leasing of Fort Chaffee, Arkansas for 
oil and gas development. 
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